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INFORMATION GATHERING OR SPEECH CREATION: HOW
TO THINK ABOUT A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD
Jared Mullen*
INTRODUCTION
As recording technology has become omnipresent in American life over the last
several decades, and recordings of police conduct have become an essential element
of contemporary public discourse, courts have increasingly confronted the important
constitutional question of whether individuals possess a First Amendment “right to
record.” The Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue; however, there is a growing
consensus among the circuits holding that individuals “have a First Amendment right
to record law enforcement [officials].”1
However, with the exception of the Seventh Circuit’s in-depth analysis in ACLU
v. Alvarez,2 the courts of appeals have largely declined to comment on the scope or
nature of the right, leaving the contours of the right to record unenumerated.3 This
lack of clarity has particular importance when confronting the question of reasonable
regulations of recording public officials, especially in the context of non-law en-
forcement officials because different analytical frameworks would impart relatively
broader or narrower discretion on government to regulate recording. While most of
the circuits that have recognized a right to record have stated that governments may
impose reasonable restrictions, only the First Circuit has elaborated on what sorts
of restrictions might be appropriate.4 And even then, that case dealt specifically with
the right to record law enforcement activities.5
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020. BA, Southern Methodist University,
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1 Clay Calvert, The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent,
Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 230, 236 (2016) (citation omitted).
2 See 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ACLU had a “strong likelihood
of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim” that Illinois eavesdropping status was
unconstitutional).
3 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1042–43
(2015) (“There is thus a substantial body of case law granting First Amendment protections
to the recording of public officials in public places, albeit . . . based on fairly cursory analysis.”).
4 See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them. . . . The
circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when the detained individual is armed, might
justify a safety measure—for example, a command that bystanders disperse—that would inci-
dentally impact an individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to film.”).
5 See id. at 5.
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Scholars have proposed several ways of thinking about the right to record, each of
which would have significant consequences for the contours of the right and the ex-
tent to which the states can impose restrictions on the right.6 There are two principal
theories. First, recording could be seen as an act of creating speech.7 Placing the act
of recording in the category of speech creation would categorize the right to record
as a type of non-expressive activity inextricably bound up with expression and,
therefore, part of the core of the free speech right and consequently subject to rela-
tively limited restrictions.8 Second, recording could be seen as principally a form of
information gathering.9 This would place the right to record in the category of “predi-
cates” to speech or “structural elements” necessary for speech and therefore subject
to broader restrictions.10
Whether the right to record is seen as creating speech or gathering information
would likely have little effect on the right to record law enforcement activity in public.
However, the nature of the right could have significant implications for the right to
record other sorts of public officials. Information gathering has been subject to a more
flexible and contextual standard then has speech creation, which is treated as essen-
tially inseparable from speech itself.11 While recording police activity is of particular
interest to the public, recording other public officials may not be seen as vital under
an information gathering construction.12 Additionally, the competing frameworks
6 See sources cited infra notes 7–9.
7 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 87 (2014).
8 See Ashley Billam, The Public’s Evolution from News Reader to News Gatherer: An
Analysis of the First Amendment Right to Videorecord Police, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 149,
153–54 (2017); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video
Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1013–14 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Police Misconduct,
Video Recording, and Procedural Barriers to Rights Enforcement, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1313,
1337 (2018); see also Kelly-Ann Weimar, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: Tattoos
and Tattooing Under the First Amendment, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 719 (2014) (arguing that
tattooing is expression, not conduct, and should be protected as such).
9 See David Murphy, Comment, “V.I.P.” Videographer Intimidation Protection: How
the Government Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape the Police, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
319, 325–26 (2013) (analogizing videography to writing, thereby affording the same protection
from government interference).
10 See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
the process of expression through a medium indistinguishable from the expression itself).
11 See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
249, 257 (2004).
12 See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1570 (2016) (“This Article assumes . . . the baseline concept
that video or audio recording of police officers in public is protected activity under the First
Amendment. Many federal courts to address the matter have assumed this to be true, some
without much discussion at all about if or how filming is a form of speech.”).
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rest on different assumptions about the nature of the act of recording, which have
important implications for the viability of the frameworks in the long term.13
This Note argues that the right to record is best understood as speech creation,
inextricably tied to expressive activity itself. This framework better captures the
realities of recording in the modern era, where instantaneous and near-instantaneous
transmission of recordings is increasingly the norm. An information-gathering frame-
work, on the other hand, rests on inflexible assumptions about the temporal relationship
between gathering and dissemination that does not accommodate these technological
innovations. Additionally, this Note argues that the importance of recording public
officials to modern political discourse supports an understanding of the right to rec-
ord as speech creation.
Under a speech creation framework, recording of public officials would be
afforded substantial protection under a time, place, and manner test.14 However, under
an information-gathering framework, government would have much greater leeway
to impose direct and indirect restrictions on speech.15 Courts would be asked to make
value judgments about the relative social value of recording different officials and
to weigh the interests of the recorder against those of the recorded.16 This framework
would lead to a narrow and, more importantly, inconsistent right to record. This
Note first reviews the current state of the right to record in each of the courts of
appeals which has found such a right. It then discusses the two doctrines of informa-
tion gathering and speech creation and the tests that courts apply to analyze restric-
tions on these rights. It also considers which of these frameworks better captures the
realities of recording in the modern era. Finally, it addresses policy concerns over
the right to record and concludes that the speech creation framework is the better fit
for recording in the modern era.
I. CURRENT RIGHT TO RECORD CASE LAW
Following the Third Circuit’s ruling in Fields v. City of Philadelphia,17 a total of
six circuits have explicitly found a First Amendment right to record.18 This Part re-
views the current case law regarding the right to record and discusses the justifications
13 See id.
14 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011); cf. Simonson, supra note 12, at
1577; Vincent Nguyen, Note, Watching Big Brother: A Citizen’s Right to Record Police, 28
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 637, 641–58 (2018).
15 See Simonson, supra note 12, at 1570.
16 See id. at 1564, 1569–70, 1575.
17 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017).
18 Nguyen, supra note 14, at 650–51 (“The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits issued rulings to protect the right of bystanders to record police actions in public,
subject to reasonable limitations. In total, ‘[t]heir collective jurisdictions now amount to
exactly half of the [United States,] and roughly [sixty] percent of the American population.’”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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that the courts have relied on in finding a right to record, as well as the shortcomings
of the current doctrine regarding the right to record.
A. First Circuit
In 2011, the First Circuit became the first to find a First Amendment right to
record when it decided Glik v. Cunniffe.19 In that case, plaintiff Simon Glik observed
three police officers arresting a man on the Boston Common.20 Glik heard another
individual object to the way the police were treating the man prompting Glik to
begin recording the altercation with his cell phone.21 He was standing about ten feet
away from the police as he recorded their activity.22 After completing the arrest, one
of the officers approached Glik, telling him: “I think you have taken enough pic-
tures.”23 A second officer asked him whether his phone recorded audio.24 Glik said
that it did, and the officer arrested him for “unlawful audio recording in violation of
Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.”25 The charges against Glik were dismissed by the
Boston Municipal Court.26 Glik filed a civil rights action against the officers in-
volved and the City of Boston for violation of his First and Fourth Amendment
rights.27 The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
Glik had a clearly established First Amendment right to record police activity.28
On appeal, the First Circuit held in favor of the plaintiff.29 The court observed
that “the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than the text’s proscription on
laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ and encompasses a range of
conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information.”30 The court
further elaborated that:
Gathering information about government officials in a form that
can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First
Amendment interest in protecting and promoting “the free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs.” . . . This is particularly true of
law enforcement officials, who are granted substantial discretion
that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties.31
19 See 655 F.3d at 79.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 79–80.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 80.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 79.
30 Id. at 82.
31 Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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The Glik decision appears to ground the right to record in the right to gather
information.32 As Glik makes clear, the right to record police activity is of particular
interest to the public, as police officers can—and regularly do—use force against
members of the public.33 Therefore, the right to record police is especially protected
under an information gathering scheme.34 The court did find a right to record public
officials in general; however, its language and its particular attention to the question
of recording police conduct leaves open the issue of whether the right to record
government officials generally and the right to record police are afforded the same
sorts of constitutional protections.35
The court in Glik did state that “the right to film is not without limitations.”36
But it declined to elaborate on what those limitations might be.37 The First Circuit
returned to the question of reasonable restrictions on the right to record in Gericke
v. Begin in 2014.38 In that case, plaintiff Carla Gericke and her friend Tyler Hanslin
were “caravanning in two cars” on their way to Hanslin’s house.39 Gericke was
following Hanslin when he was pulled over by a police officer.40 Gericke pulled her
car to the side of the road, as she did not know the directions to Hanslin’s house.41
The officer approached Gericke’s car and ordered her to move her car.42 Gericke
informed the officer that she was going to pull into an adjacent parking lot and wait
for Hanslin.43 After parking her car, Gericke retrieved a video camera from her car
and announced to the officer that she was going to record him, however, when she
could not get her camera to work, she simply held it up as though she were record-
ing.44 Then, a second officer arrived and approached Gericke, who was sitting in her
car with the camera placed on the center console.45 That officer demanded to know
where the camera was and asked Gericke for her license and registration.46 When
Gericke refused, she was arrested and charged with “disobeying a police officer, ob-
structing a government official, and, the charge relevant here—unlawful interception
of oral communications.”47 The town prosecutor declined to move forward with the
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1041.
35 Glik, 655 F.3d at 83; see also Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1040–41.
36 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
37 Id.
38 See 753 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2014).
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 3–4.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted).
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charges against Gericke, and she brought a civil rights action against the officers
involved and the Weare Police Department for violation of her First Amendment
rights.48 The district court found in favor of Gericke and the defendants appealed.49
On appeal, the court addressed the question of “whether the occasion of a traffic
stop places Gericke’s attempted filming outside the constitutionally protected right
to film police that [it] discussed in Glik.”50 Turning to the question of reasonable
restrictions on the right to record, the court observed that traffic stops can be particu-
larly dangerous for officers, and therefore, under particular circumstances, might
justify reasonable restrictions in the interest of safety.51 The court concluded that “a
police order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to film police
performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer
can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere,
with his duties.”52 This analysis would fit under both a speech creation and an informa-
tion gathering framework but offers no clue as to which one the court is applying.
Therefore, although the First Circuit grounded the First Amendment right to
record in the information-gathering right, it also reserved broad latitude for the
exercise of the right, at least in the context of recording police officers in public.53
However, it did not identify a particular test or frame of analysis against which to
analyze potential restraints on the right to record.54 Again, Gericke, like Glik leaves
open the question of whether the contours of the right to record are the same when
recording non-law enforcement public officials.55
B. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit was the most recent to find a First Amendment right to record
in Fields v. City of Philadelphia.56 The plaintiffs Amanda Geraci and Richard Fields
filed separate civil rights actions against the City of Philadelphia for violation of
their First Amendment rights.57 Fields was a Temple University student who was
walking down a street when he saw a group of police officers breaking up a house
party.58 He took a photo of the scene with his cell phone.59 An officer noticed Fields
48 Id.
49 Id. at 4–5.
50 Id. at 7.
51 Id. at 8 (“The circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when the detained individual
is armed, might justify a safety measure—for example, a command that bystanders disperse—
that would incidentally impact an individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to film.”).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 8–10.
55 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1041–42.
56 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017).
57 Id. at 356.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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and ordered him to leave; when he refused, the officer arrested him and confiscated
his phone.60 “The officer then released Fields and issued him a citation for ‘Obstruct-
ing Highway and Other Public Passages.’ These charges were withdrawn when the
officer did not appear at the court hearing.”61 Geraci, a member of a police watchdog
group, was attending an anti-fracking protest as a legal observer.62 Police observed
Geraci filming an arrest and an officer pushed her against a pillar for several minutes,
preventing her from observing or recording the arrest.63 The district court held for
the defendants, ruling that the Third Circuit did not recognize a First Amendment
right to record.64
On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs.65 The district court had focused
on whether the plaintiffs had had an expressive intent at the time they were record-
ing; i.e., whether they were intending to communicate a particular message by their
act of recording.66 The court of appeals disagreed with this analysis, observing that:
[The district court’s] reasoning ignores that the value of the
recordings may not be immediately obvious, and only after review
of them does their worth become apparent. The First Amendment
protects actual photos, videos, and recordings, and for this pro-
tection to have meaning the Amendment must also protect the act
of creating that material. There is no practical difference between
allowing police to prevent people from taking recordings and
actually banning the possession or distribution of them.67
The district court’s reasoning suggests that it viewed recording as a type of ex-
pressive activity, an action that can have expressive value and therefore be protected
but which does not always have such value.68 The appellate court’s analysis in this
Section suggests that it viewed the right to record as speech creation, and therefore
part of the core right to free speech, unlike the First Circuit, which discussed the right
to record exclusively in the context of information gathering.69 However, the Third
Circuit later seems to dismiss the speech creation argument, instead stating that
“recording police activity in public falls squarely within the First Amendment right
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 356–57.
65 Id. at 353.
66 Id. at 356 (“[T]he District Court on its own decided that Plaintiffs’ activities were not pro-
tected by the First Amendment because they presented no evidence that their ‘conduct may be
construed as expression of a belief or criticism of police activity.’” (internal citation omitted)).
67 Id. at 358 (internal citation omitted).
68 Cf. id.
69 See discussion supra notes 32–35, 51 and accompanying text.
810 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:803
of access to information. As no doubt the press has this right, so does the public.”70
Finally, the court also stated that the right to record is subject to reasonable restric-
tions, specifically noting that recording that tends to interfere with police activity
may not be protected.71
The court’s invocation of both information gathering and speech creation leaves
unclear the test that should be applied to analyze potential restrictions of the right
to record. What is clear is that the court rejected the idea that recording falls into the
category of expressive activity as unworkable. As such, the Third Circuit’s decision
in Fields leaves the scope of the right to record in that jurisdiction substantially less
clear than in the First Circuit. While the First Circuit grounded the right in the right
to gather information, the Third Circuit references both the speech creation line of
precedent as well as the information gathering precedent.72 The court in Fields
alludes to reasonable restrictions, suggesting that recording that interferes with police
business might not be protected.73 The Third Circuit’s language here is somewhat
broader than that used by the First Circuit in Gericke, which suggests that restricting
the right to record is permissible when it interferes with police business in such a
way as to increase the danger of a situation.74 Like the First Circuit, the Third Circuit
does not specifically address the contours of the right outside the police context.75
C. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit addressed the question of the First Amendment right to record
for the first time in Turner v. Lieutenant Driver.76 Here, plaintiff Phillip Turner was
standing on a public sidewalk across the street from a police station and recording
the exterior of the building.77 Two officers pulled up to the station, got out of their
patrol car, and approached Turner, asking him for his I.D.78 When Turner repeatedly
refused to identify himself, one of the officers arrested him and confiscated his video
camera, placing him in the back of his patrol car.79 Turner was left in the car for sev-
eral hours before eventually being released without charges.80 Turner brought a civil
70 Fields, 862 F.3d at 359 (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 360 (“If a person’s recording interferes with police activity, that activity might
not be protected. For instance, recording a police conversation with a confidential informant
may interfere with an investigation and put a life at stake.”).
72 Compare Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011), and Bhagwat, supra note
3, at 1064, with Fields, 862 F.3d at 358–60.
73 See Fields, 862 F.3d at 360.
74 Compare id., with Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014).
75 Cf. Fields, 862 F.3d at 360 (“We do not say that all recording is protected or desirable.
The right to record police is not absolute.”).
76 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017).
77 Id. at 683.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 684.
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rights action against the officers involved individually.81 The district court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss and Turner appealed.82
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found a First Amendment right to record.83 The
court observed that the First Amendment prohibits government from “limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”84 Circuit Judge
Wiener began by discussing the right to record in the context of the right to gather
information about government activities before stating: “[T]he Supreme Court has
never ‘drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech
(such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the
artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded.’”85 The court also
stated that reasonable restrictions apply to the right to record, but declined to elaborate
on what might constitute reasonable restrictions.86
Like the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit clearly established a right to record but
leaves the basis and the contours of the right unclear.87 Its decision in Turner refer-
ences both the right to gather information and speech creation, without making it
clear in which line of precedent it had grounded the right to record.88 Additionally,
the court only addresses the right to record police activity, without examining the
right to record nonpolice officials.89
D. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit addressed the right to record in ACLU v. Alvarez in 2012,
writing the most comprehensive opinion on the issue thus far.90 In Alvarez, the ACLU
filed a pre-enforcement action against the Cook County State’s Attorney for “decla-
ratory and injunctive relief barring her from enforcing [Illinois’s eavesdropping]
statute” against members of the ACLU engaging in a “police accountability pro-
gram,” which would involve making recordings of police officers in public places.91
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 685.
84 Id. at 688 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
85 Id. at 689 (quoting Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.
2010)).
86 Id. at 690.
87 Compare Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 358–60 (3d Cir. 2017), and
discussion supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text, with Turner, 848 F.3d at 688–90.
88 See Turner, 848 F.3d at 688–90.
89 See id. at 689. The Turner decision did note that “[g]athering information about gov-
ernment officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First
Amendment interest,” but did not expand on nonpolice officials. Id.
90 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1042.
91 ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The district court found that there was no First Amendment right to record.92 The
ACLU appealed.93
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found for the plaintiffs.94 The court first observed
that videos and recordings “are media of expression commonly used for the preserva-
tion and dissemination of information and ideas and thus are ‘included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’”95 There-
fore, if the act of making a recording is unprotected, then the means of expression—a
recording or video itself—is insecure.96 The court observed that the First Amend-
ment interest in recording public officials is strong, grounding its analysis of the
right to record in the broader consideration of recording all public officials rather
than police specifically.97
The court also discussed the right to record as part of the right to gather informa-
tion, noting that the right to gather information is ill-defined and subject to limitation.98
In its discussion of newsgathering, the court elaborated on the sort of restrictions that
may be imposed on the right to record, noting that the Supreme Court has ruled that
“generally applicable” laws do not violate the First Amendment if they incidentally
infringe speech.99 Reviewing the Supreme Court’s precedents on the application of
generally applicable laws to speech and speech-adjacent conduct, the court con-
cluded that:
When the expressive element of an expressive activity triggers the
application of a general law, First Amendment interests are in
play. On the other hand, when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements
are combined, and the “nonspeech” element (e.g., prostitution)
triggers the legal sanction, the incidental effect on speech rights
will not normally raise First Amendment concerns.100
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 595 (quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952)).
96 Id. (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within
the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to
disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual
recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the record-
ing is wholly unprotected, as the State’s Attorney insists.”).
97 Id. at 597.
98 Id. at 598–99 (“The Supreme Court has not elaborated much on its abstract observation
in Branzburg that ‘news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.’ The
Branzburg opinion itself suggests some caution in relying too heavily on the Court’s discussion
of a First Amendment right to gather news and information.” (internal citations omitted)).
99 Id. at 601 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg rested in part on the princi-
ple that a generally applicable law will not violate the First Amendment simply because its
application has an incidental effect on speech or the press.”).
100 Id. at 602.
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While the Seventh Circuit discussed the question of a First Amendment right to record
in some depth, it failed to clarify the particular test that should be applied to potential
restrictions of the right to record.101 Instead, the court invoked three separate doctrines
in its discussion.102 It invoked the news-gathering right established in Branzburg,103 the
concept of speech creation,104 and the doctrine of symbolic speech105 at different points
in its discussion. This scattershot approach is problematic as each of these doctrines in-
volves a different test against which courts must analyze content-neutral restrictions
under different tests.106 The court draws out this distinction but fails to resolve it.107
While the Seventh Circuit appeared to prefer an interpretation of the right to record
as an act of creating speech,108 the court also acknowledged that it could be seen as
information gathering as well.109 In its analysis of the Supreme Court’s precedent on
generally applicable laws, the court drew out a critical element of the distinction be-
tween viewing speech as newsgathering, a “corollary right,” and viewing it as speech
creation, inseparable from speech itself, in that they implicated different regulatory
schemes.110 If the right to record is a form of speech creation, it is an activity inextrica-
bly bound up with expression and is therefore entitled to time, place, and manner
protections.111 If it is information gathering, it enjoys much less protection.112
E. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of the right to record in 1995 in
Fordyce v. City of Seattle.113 In that case, plaintiff Jerry Edmon Fordyce was par-
ticipating in a public protest march and also videotaping the march on behalf of a
local television station.114 Throughout the day, Fordyce also videotaped the police
officers present at the event.115 The officers responded negatively to Fordyce’s
filming and at least one officer “attempted physically to dissuade Fordyce from his
mission.”116 Eventually, the officers arrested Fordyce when he taped a group of
101 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1044.
102 See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595–99.
103 See id. at 597–99 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
104 See id. at 595–96.
105 See id. at 596.
106 See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 650; see also Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1058–65.
107 See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 600; Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1040.
108 Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 (“[T]here is no fixed First Amendment line between the
act of creating speech and the speech itself.”).
109 See id. at 600.
110 Id. at 595.
111 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 267–68.
112 Id. at 268–69.
113 See 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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bystanders without their consent.117 Fordyce filed a civil rights action against the
city, in part for violating his First Amendment right to gather news.118 The district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Fordyce appealed.119
On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded.120 How-
ever, because Fordyce did not raise the First Amendment issue on appeal, the court
addressed it only briefly.121 The court did note that Fordyce possessed a First Amend-
ment right to record, but didn’t elaborate.122 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, left the
issue entirely up in the air, with no specific guidance on the right to record beyond
the fact that it exists.123
F. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit quickly addressed the right to record in Smith v. City of
Cumming.124 Plaintiffs James and Barbara Smith filed a civil rights action against
the City of Cumming and its police chief for violation of Mr. Smith’s First Amend-
ment rights.125 They specifically alleged that Mr. Smith had been prevented from
videotaping police.126 The court
agree[d] with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right,
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to
photograph or videotape police conduct. The First Amendment
protects the right to gather information about what public offi-
cials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record
matters of public interest.127
However, the court found that the Smiths had failed to demonstrate that the defen-
dants had actually infringed their First Amendment rights and dismissed the case.128
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit found a First Amendment right to record,
but was extremely cursory in its analysis, leaving the right mostly undefined.129 The
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 438–39.
120 Id. at 439.
121 Nguyen, supra note 14, at 657.
122 Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
123 See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 657.
124 212 F.3d 1332, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2000).
125 Id. at 1332.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1333.
128 Id.
129 Compare Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995), and discussion
supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text, with Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.
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court stated that time, place, and manner restrictions applied, but neglected to ex-
plain why.130 This would suggest that the court views the right to record as speech
creation, but it is impossible to draw a firm conclusion from the cursory analysis of
the court’s opinion.131
The appellate courts have thus left the state of the right to record very unclear.132
While a majority of Americans live in a jurisdiction that recognizes the right, it
remains ill-defined.133 Among those circuits that engaged in a more thorough analysis
of the right, none clearly distinguished between the right as speech creation and the
right as information gathering, although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the
implications of the approaches were different.134 Additionally, the courts almost ex-
clusively considered the right in the context of recording police activity, although
several found a right to record public officials more generally.135 Only the First and
Seventh Circuits considered the question of reasonable restrictions in any detail,136
but only the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that those restrictions might differ based
on the particular theory in which the right to record is based.137 Neither court ex-
plicitly identified a test to apply to potential restrictions of the right to record, leaving
the issue very much in the air.138 Despite its importance to modern civil society, the
right to record is left poorly grounded in doctrine and, accordingly, ill-defined.139
II. EXAMINING THE SPEECH CREATION AND INFORMATION GATHERING THEORIES
As previously noted, there are two dominant scholarly theories regarding the
right to record.140 Each has different implications for the scope of the right and the
potential limitations that may be placed on it by government.141 This Part examines
130 See Nguyen, supra note 14, at 657–58.
131 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1042.
132 Id. at 1044; see also discussion supra Part I.
133 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1044.
134 Id. at 1039–40.
135 See id. at 1038, 1041.
136 See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,
601–02 (7th Cir. 2012); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1039–41.
137 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1038–40.
138 Id. at 1041, 1044.
139 See id. at 1044.
140 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text; see also Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and
the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 185 (2017) (“A right to record fits not only within free
speech intuitions and First Amendment theory but also within several lines of well-established
doctrine. Recording might be protected as speech itself, or it might be protected because it is
a necessary part of a recognized communications medium. The First Amendment also protects
the corollary or penumbral rights that are necessary for speech; newsgathering is a particular
kind of corollary right.”).
141 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 257 (“[R]ecognizing a general right to gather infor-
mation in order to engage in ‘speech’ would be unduly broad and unmanageable, encouraging
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these two theories in greater detail and attempts to discern the potential implications
that they have for the scope of the right to record. It first considers the information-
gathering doctrine, sometimes called the newsgathering doctrine. Then it discusses
the concept of speech creation and analyzes it through the widely cited Ninth Circuit
case Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach.142
A. Information Gathering
The Supreme Court first considered a right to gather information in Zemel v.
Rusk.143 In that case, a citizen sued to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba.144
After the Cuban Revolution, the State Department “broke relations” with Cuba and
required that United States citizens who were seeking to travel there get their pass-
port validated by the Secretary of State.145 The petitioner held a valid passport and
sought to get that passport validated—first for travel to Cuba as a tourist—and then
for the purpose of gathering information about the state of affairs in Cuba.146 After
he was denied permission to travel there, he filed a complaint and sought a declara-
tory judgment holding, in part, that denial of permission to travel to Cuba violated
his First Amendment rights.147
The appellant argued that denying him the opportunity to travel to Cuba interfered
with his ability to become informed about the foreign policy of the United States and
its effect on foreign nations.148 The Court agreed with the appellant that restricting the
ability to travel did, in fact, restrict the free flow of information.149 However, the Court
nonetheless rejected the argument that the restriction implicated the First Amend-
ment.150 The Court held that the restriction was a restriction on action and observed
that “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”151 It concluded that “[t]he right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”152
Thus, it rejected the idea that information gathering was entitled to constitutional
protection when it first considered the question of First Amendment protections for
an undesirable increase in social conflict involving First Amendment values and other interests
valued by society.”).
142 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
143 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Steven Helle, Reconsidering the Gathering/Publication Dichotomy:
Recording as Speech? What Next?, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537, 540 (2013).
144 Helle, supra note 143, at 540.
145 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3.
146 Id. at 3–4.
147 Id. at 4.
148 Id. at 16.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 16–17.
152 Id. at 17.
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non-speech activity for the purpose of information gathering.153 The Court acknowl-
edged that such a restriction likely did restrict the free flow of information, but observed
that restrictions on the ability of the public to freely enter the White House also impede
the flow of information.154 Importantly, while the Court categorically rejected the
argument that the ability to travel was protected, it did not completely reject the idea
that information gathering may be entitled to some level of protection.155 The Court
stated that there is not an unrestrained right to gather, not that there is no right to
gather at all.156
The Court next addressed the question of information gathering in Branzburg v.
Hayes.157 This time, the Court directly confronted the question in relation to journal-
ism and freedom of the press.158 In that case, a reporter refused to testify before a
grand jury as to the identities of a series of sources for stories he had written on the
manufacture of hash from marijuana and the local drug scene.159 He asserted a First
Amendment right to protect the confidentiality of his sources under the Free Press
Clause.160 The Court ruled that the Free Press Clause does not grant members of the
press the right to ignore valid laws of general applicability.161 The Court rejected the
argument that the press as an institution has a separate and greater right than the pub-
lic in general.162 At the same time, the Court stated that newsgathering is entitled to
some degree of First Amendment protection.163 However, the Court did not elaborate
on what those protections might be.164 The logical conclusion to Branzburg, however,
is that the constitutional protections of newsgathering must extend to the public at
large and cannot be confined to the institutional press.165 The information gathering
153 Id. at 16–17.
154 Id. at 17.
155 Id. at 16.
156 Id. at 17.
157 408 U.S. 665 (1972); David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment,
38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835, 845 (2017).
158 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–71.
159 Id. at 668.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 682–83 (“It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of
general applicability. Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving substantial public in-
terests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that
may be imposed.”).
162 See id. at 684–85.
163 Id. at 681 (“We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the
country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.”).
164 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American
Press, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 573–74 (2017).
165 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Tech-
nology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 462 (2012).
818 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:803
privilege has remained ill-defined since Branzburg.166 The Court has generally found
the privilege applicable to particular, narrow categories of speech.167
The Court returned to the question of information gathering and free press rights
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.168 There a Virginia trial court had granted
a motion to close a murder trial to the public.169 Two newspaper reporters requested
a hearing to vacate the order closing the trial.170 The Court held that closed trials
violated the First Amendment right to receive information.171 The Court declared that
the “expressly guaranteed freedoms [of the First Amendment] share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government.”172 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan proposed a conceptual frame-
work that became the basis for the Court’s information gathering jurisprudence.173
Justice Brennan argued that the right to gather information was a “structural” right with
a “role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”174
He suggested that such a structural right should be analyzed under a balancing test,
balancing the interest in access to information against “opposing interests” in protect-
ing it from access.175 Brennan further proposed two principles to guide the applica-
tion of the test:
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular
166 See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20 (2016)
(“[T]he Branzburg decision is frustratingly ambiguous. To begin with, the Court framed its
discussion by observing that ‘a State’s interest must be “compelling” or “paramount” to justify
even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights.’ It then proceeded to apply elevated scru-
tiny. ‘On the records now before us,’ the Court remarked—intimating a possible limitation
on its holding—there was ‘no basis’ for giving constitutional priority to journalists based on
a ‘consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering.’” (citations omitted)).
167 See id. at 21.
168 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
169 Id. at 560.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 580–81.
172 Id. at 575.
173 Brian C. Murchison, The Visibility Value of the First Amendment, 26 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 995, 996 (2018) (“In large part, the right of access is a product of Justice William
Brennan’s constitutional philosophy; in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence and other
writings, he explained the right as a ‘structural’ protection in the sense of relating not to ex-
pression itself but to ‘the structure of communications necessary for the existence of our
democracy.’” (footnotes omitted)).
174 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“An assertion
of the prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed by considering the
information sought and the opposing interests invaded.”(footnote omitted)).
175 Bruce Brown & Selina MacLaren, Holding the Presidency Accountable: A Path Forward
for Journalists and Lawyers, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 115 (2018).
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proceedings or information. . . . Second, the value of access must
be measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
statements that all information bears upon public issues what is
crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular gov-
ernment process is important in terms of that very process.176
Justice Brennan’s framework was adopted by the Court in Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court for Norfolk County.177 In that case, the Globe Newspaper sought
to gain access to a rape trial where the defendant was accused of sexual assault of three
girls who were minors at the time of the trial.178 The Court had ordered that the trial
be closed in order to protect the minor witnesses from public scrutiny during their
testimony.179 The Globe sought injunctive relief.180 The Court held that “the circum-
stances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited;
the State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one.”181 While the Court
agreed that the State’s interest in protecting minor victims was compelling, it ruled that
the State’s remedy was not sufficiently narrowly tailored.182 Justice Brennan applied the
analysis that he developed in his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers to conclude
that the press and public have a general interest in access to criminal trials.183
Thus, in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, Justice Brennan sets out
a conceptual framework that defines information gathering as a structural right rather
than part of the core speech right, which protects interpersonal communication.184
In order to determine whether information gathering is entitled to First Amendment
protection, courts must employ a balancing test, weighing the value of the informa-
tion sought against the importance of the “opposing interests” harmed by granting
the right.185 This test is to be guided by two considerations: whether the information
sought is traditionally available to the public, and the specific value of the information
in the facts before the court.186
The newsgathering right has rarely been invoked by the Court since Globe
Newspaper and is generally quite ill-defined.187 The contours and limitations of the
176 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
177 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Campbell, supra note 166, at 23 n.119.
178 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598–601.
179 Id. at 598.
180 Id. at 599.
181 Id. at 606.
182 Id. at 606–07, 609.
183 See Murchison, supra note 173, at 996–97.
184 See id.; see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 603–07; Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
185 Richmond Newspapers Inc., 448 U.S. at 588–89.
186 Id. at 589.
187 McDonald, supra note 11, at 254 (“[T]he Court has created a legal scheme governing
a First Amendment right to gather information that is . . . fragmented and inconsistent. . . .”).
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right are best understood in the context of the Court’s broader First Amendment
jurisprudence. In the Court’s conception, free speech involves an extremely broad
array of conduct.188 The primary distinction that the Court makes is between content-
based and content-neutral regulations of speech.189 Laws that fall within the former
category are subject to the highest form of scrutiny.190 While they are not unlawful
per se, the bar is set extremely high in that circumstance.191 For content-neutral re-
strictions on speech, there is a further division between purely expressive activity
and activity with an expressive component.192 The distinction can be somewhat
subtle. Purely expressive activity generally includes speech itself as well as other
things, such as music, which serve no purpose other than to communicate an idea.193
Activity with an expressive component includes things like burning draft cards and
national flags (the two most famous examples).194 These are actions that can have
an expressive element but don’t have one inherently. Thus, while an activist who
burns an American flag as part of an anti-war protest probably intends to convey a
message by doing so, an individual burning a flag as a means of disposal in accor-
dance with the flag code likely does not.195
Content-neutral restrictions on purely expressive activity and activity with an
expressive component are analyzed under different tests.196 Restrictions on purely
188 Id. at 260 (“[T]he Court has construed the First Amendment broadly to cover conduct
that is either expressive itself—by its nature or because engaged in for an expressive purpose—
or intimately related to acts of expression. . . . [T]he Court has also pulled certain forms of
conduct within its ambit not because they are expressive in nature, but rather because they
are deemed necessary to accord full meaning and substance to those guarantees.”).
189 Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
615, 616 (1991) (“One of the most important [First-Amendment principles] is the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech. The distinction has enjoyed
growing prominence as a judicial tool for categorizing government actions regarding expression
and for justifying the level of scrutiny applied to those actions.” (footnote omitted)).
190 Id. at 625.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 636 (“The meaning of content discrimination evolved alongside the development
of different doctrinal lines designed to deal with the distinct problems of content-neutral reg-
ulations of speech. Two of the most important of these lines are the symbolic speech doctrine
and the [time, place, or manner] doctrine.”).
193 McDonald, supra note 11, at 258–59 (“[Speech] includes not only acts of speaking or
communicating in other verbal or aural forms (e.g., singing or orchestral performances), but
also the acts of representing things visually in writings, pictures or other works of art, or
audio-visually in multiple formats such as text, sound, graphics, pictures, or videos that are
transmitted via electronic means of communication . . . .”).
194 See id.; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418–19 (1989) (holding that burning
an American flag as part of an anti-war protest is protected expression); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (holding that burning a draft card to protest the war in Vietnam
is protected expression but that it is overridden by the government’s compelling interest in
maintaining the draft).
195 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418.
196 Williams, supra note 189, at 636.
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expressive activity are analyzed under the time, place, and manner test.197 Under this
test, the government must demonstrate that the challenged regulation can be justified
without reference to the content of the speech being regulated, that it advances some
significant government interest, and that it leaves open ample alternatives for ex-
pression.198 This standard can be variable. For instance, the Court has substituted “ade-
quate alternatives” for “ample alternatives” on at least one occasion.199 It is also much
more lenient than the strict scrutiny standard applied to content-based restrictions.200
Restrictions on activity with an expressive component are analyzed under the
so-called “symbolic speech doctrine.”201 This doctrine is comprised of two tests. As
a preliminary matter, it must be demonstrated that there was “[a]n intent to convey
a particularized message” and that “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”202 This
test—the Spence test—deliminates how a court is to determine whether a specific
act was sufficiently expressive so as to warrant First Amendment protection.203
Once it is determined that an act is expressive, the court turns to the regulation
in question.204 For a regulation to survive scrutiny, it must further an important or
substantial interest that is unrelated to the suppression of the expression in question
and is an incidental restriction, no greater than necessary to advance the interest.205
While this standard might appear stronger than the time, place, and manner test at
first blush, the Court has affirmatively stated that the government generally has
greater leeway to regulate expressive conduct under this test than it does to regulate
purely expressive conduct under the time, place, and manner test.206
There are other subcategories of speech within this basic framework.207 The first
is non-expressive activity that is inextricably bound up with purely expressive activ-
ity.208 Certain essential predicates to speech, i.e., the processes of creating speech,
197 Id. at 637.
198 Id. at 639–40.
199 Id. at 642 (“This test can also have degrees of strictness. The Court has sometimes de-
scribed the requirement as one of ample alternative channels, which appears to set a high
standard. In practice, however, the Court has often applied an adequate alternatives test, not an
ample alternatives test.”(footnotes omitted)).
200 Id. at 644.
201 Id.
202 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam).
203 James McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA.
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2008).
204 See, e.g., id. at 37–42.
205 Williams, supra note 189, at 647.
206 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government generally has a freer
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”).
207 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 260–61.
208 Id. at 260 (“The Court has also pulled certain forms of conduct within its ambit not
because they are expressive in nature, but rather because they are deemed necessary to accord
full meaning and substance to [free speech] guarantees.”).
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are also extended full First Amendment protection under the time, place, manner
speech even though they are not in and of themselves expressive.209 This subject will
be covered in greater detail in the next Section.
Finally, there is non-expressive conduct that is not bound up in expressive activ-
ity.210 This last category is where information gathering is generally situated.211 Justice
Brennan deemed this category “structural rights,” which are necessary for speech and
should be protected but must be balanced against other competing interests as well.212
B. Speech Creation
Speech creation or speech production finds its origin as a distinct category within
the broader category of free speech in the 1983 Supreme Court decision in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.213 In that case, the Court
considered a use tax on paper and ink that was applied exclusively to periodical
publications that consumed over $100,000 worth of paper and ink per annum.214
The Court held that, while states could apply “generally applicable economic
regulations” to the press without implicating the First Amendment, the use tax applied
a special burden to press institutions.215 Such a tax, the Court suggested, appeared
to be related to a goal of suppressing the press and therefore the regulation would
have to pass strict scrutiny to be upheld.216 The Court did not elaborate on its reasoning
for finding that the use of paper and ink deserved First Amendment protection.217
However, it is notable that the use of ink and paper is not in and of itself expressive.
Instead, it is non-expressive activity that is closely tied up in the expressive activities
of the press.218 Without ink and paper, the press would not be able to undertake its
core expressive activity.219
209 Id. at 260–61.
210 Id.
211 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
212 Id.
213 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1036 (“The foundational case in this
area is undoubtedly the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.”).
214 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 575.
215 Id. at 581–82.
216 Id. at 585 (“Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests
protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation.” (footnote omitted)).
217 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1036–37.
218 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 259–60.
219 Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1033–35.
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Lower courts have built on the foundation laid by the Court in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. to extend First Amendment protection to a range of activities that is
non-expressive itself but is bound up in the creation or production of core speech.220
Activities that have been held to fall within this category includes activities as
diverse as still photography, tattooing, and pornography.221 The best statement of the
principle that emerged from Minneapolis Star & Tribune comes from the Ninth
Circuit decision in Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach.222
In Anderson, the court considered a complaint by a tattoo parlor which alleged
that municipal ordinances which effectively banned the operation of tattoo parlors in
a city violated the First Amendment rights of tattoo artists.223 The court decided that
tattooing was more similar to “purely expressive activity,” such as writing, than to
conduct that merely had an expressive element, such as burning a draft card.224
Because the court found tattooing to be purely expressive, it held that it was entitled
to full First Amendment protection.225 In the court’s estimation, tattooing was part
of a process, each part of which was entitled to First Amendment protection.226 It
stated that “[t]he process of expression through a medium has never been thought
so distinct from the expression itself that we could disaggregate Picasso from his
brushes and canvas, or that we could value Beethoven without the benefit of strings
and woodwinds.”227 Thus, certain activity that is not inherently expressive is pro-
tected by the First Amendment by virtue of the fact that certain types of expression
are impossible without those acts.228 In other words, some conduct is so integral to
an act of expression that it must be afforded full First Amendment protection in
order to protect that expression.229
Speech creation or speech production falls within the core of the First Amendment
and is therefore afforded regular First Amendment protections.230 While information
gathering and speech creation both fall within a grey area outside pure speech itself,
speech creation is afforded significantly more protection by the courts.
III. RECORDING AS INFORMATION GATHERING VERSUS SPEECH CREATION
This Part discusses the right to record in terms of the information gathering and
speech creation frameworks. It first examines the practical aspects of the right to record
220 Id. at 1034.
221 Id.
222 See 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
223 Id. at 1055.
224 Id. at 1062.
225 Id. at 1068.
226 Id. at 1060.
227 Id. at 1062.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 1061.
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and asks whether it fits more cleanly into the speech creation or information-gathering
frameworks. It then considers the policy implications of the two frameworks in
regards to the right to record and the breadth of the right under them.
A. Fitting Recording into the Frameworks
Placing recording in either framework would have important policy implications
for the scope of the right to record. However, before considering the implications
of the two frameworks, it is important to consider whether recording actually fits
into both categories as a substantive matter.
At first blush, the act of recording has much in common with information gather-
ing. For instance, both generally involve the collection of statements or observations
of third parties, which may be given unintentionally or intentionally.231 Thus, in the
traditional example of information gathering, involving a reporter attending a trial,
the reporter collects observations about the trial, the witnesses presented, and the
statements made for later use in a piece of writing or a news segment. Meanwhile,
the typical situation imagined in right to record cases involves an individual filming
an altercation involving law enforcement or other public officials in a public space
without their consent. The exercise of either right, therefore, raises concerns about
the infringement of the rights of others in a way that pure expression may not.232
Another important similarity, one commentator argues, is that both information
gathering and recording involve a distinct temporal gap between the gathering of the
information that will constitute speech, the creation of the message to be dissemi-
nated as speech, and the actual publication of the speech.233 Both acts are part of a
chain of activity that eventually culminates in speech and, like other preceding links
in the chain, might be regulated without a high risk of censorship.234
While there are some similarities between information gathering and recording,
the differences between the two acts are significant, particularly as recording tech-
nology continues to progress.
231 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 271 (“[T]he right to gather information often will
involve attempts to acquire information from ‘unwilling’ speakers like the government in
certain cases or situations that may involve no ‘speakers’ at all . . . .”).
232 Id. at 266–67 (“[A]s freedom of expression moves away from such ‘pure speech’
activities, and expression is delivered or facilitated through forms of conduct beyond the
basic acts of speaking or publishing, the potential for interference with other socially-valued
rights and liberties increases. No longer is that interference limited to reluctant reception or
listening, but now a wider panoply of potential conflict is opened . . . .”).
233 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1033–34 (“[T]here is a time lag, sometimes a substantial
one, between creating the message and its dissemination to its intended audience.”).
234 Id. at 1066 (“[W]e are dealing here with laws regulating not speech, but speech pro-
duction, itself a penumbral right, and doing so in content-neutral terms, thereby reducing the
risk of censorship.”).
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For one, the assertion that there is a distinct time lag between gathering and dis-
seminating a recording is increasingly out of step with modern recording technology.235
Indeed, given the increasing interconnectedness of internet-enabled devices and the
proliferation of technologies such as streaming, the temporal distinction between the
acts of recording and publishing is reduced to seconds or is even obliterated alto-
gether.236 A legal framework that turns on that distinction is increasingly untenable
in a world of instant and near-instant mass communication.237 As people become in-
creasingly interconnected and communication becomes increasingly instantaneous, it
is difficult to take seriously the assertion that recording and dissemination are not tied
up with one another.238 While this distinction may have made sense in an era of broad-
sheets and broadcast television, it does not work in an era of Twitter and Instagram.
Additionally, the risk of censorship may actually be heightened in the context
of recording relative to information gathering.239 In the traditional information gath-
ering scenario, there are alternative ways to obtain the information necessary to
produce a news article or television segment. A reporter could get access to tran-
scripts or other government records if they are refused access to a courtroom. Such
documents offer a rough approximation of the information that a reporter would
otherwise have had access to in producing their subsequent report. In the recording
context, however, if a bystander is prevented from filming a particular scene or event,
a substantial part of the value of the antecedent speech is lost. An individual might
substitute interviews with witnesses or perhaps footage of the aftermath of an alter-
cation, but such substitute footage cannot substantially replace footage of the altercation
or activity itself.
Given these considerations, recording, at least in a modern context, fits more
clearly within a speech creation context.240 The act of recording a particular scene,
incident, or altercation is inextricably connected to the dissemination of a recording
of that scene.241 Additionally, the temporal distinction between various steps in the
process of speech is increasingly irrelevant to the act of making a recording, which
today can be simultaneous with the publication of the recording.242 Recording in the
modern era increasingly resembles pure speech rather than information gathering.243
235 Helle, supra note 143, at 556 (“With webcams, ‘smart’ phones, and augmented reality
head-mounted displays, gathering and publication are becoming more antiquated as discrete
concepts by the nanosecond.”).
236 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1053; Helle, supra note 143, at 551.
237 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1053; Helle, supra note 143, at 551.
238 See Helle, supra note 143, at 556–57.
239 See id. at 539.
240 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1033–35.
241 See Helle, supra note 143, at 550.
242 See Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 1033–34.
243 See id. at 1033 (“Pure, oral speech, however, has a distinct characteristic in that it is
‘created’ simultaneously with its dissemination. The speaker makes noise, and the noise is heard
at the same time.”); see also Kaminski, supra note 140, at 188 (“When you can demarcate
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B. Policy Implications
The right to record fits more closely with speech creation than it does with
information gathering. However, it is also important to consider the potential policy
ramifications of grounding the right to record in either the information gathering
right or the speech creation right. If recording is speech creation, and therefore an
action bound up with expressive activity, then content-neutral regulation of speech
is subject to time, place, and manner restrictions.244 Any content-neutral regulation
would, therefore, have to be justified without reference to the act of recording, advance
a compelling state interest, and leave open ample alternatives for recording.245
Some commentators have suggested that the act of recording public officials is
invariably an expressive act, and therefore any restriction on recording would have
to further a compelling government interest.246 However, this is not necessarily the
case. While recording is bound up in an expressive act, it could be undertaken in a
non-expressive way. Furthermore, allowing the test to turn on whether or not recording
is being done in an expressive manner creates its own problems.247 Content-neutral
restrictions on recording are possible and necessary in certain circumstances. Regu-
lations that restrict how or from where individuals can record public officials could
be permissible to ensure safety during police interactions for instance.248
A time, place, and manner test would make it very difficult for government to
prevent the recording of public officials. The modern time, place, and manner test
requires that any regulation leave open “ample alternative channels for the communi-
cation of the information.”249 While this requirement has been formulated in language
of variable strength, whether the test is phrased as requiring adequate alternatives
the act of producing communication from the act of actually communicating, this raises the
questions of whether the act of production is truly part of the communicative moment and
how far into conduct First Amendment protections extend.”(footnote omitted)).
244 Williams, supra note 189, at 644–47.
245 See id. at 647.
246 See Simonson, supra note 12, at 1575–76 (“The content of the message of a bystander
who is visibly pointing a recording device in the direction of the police is different than a by-
stander who has their hands at their sides. The recording bystander is telling the officer: I am
watching you, and I care about how you speak and act when you are on duty. . . . [W]hen a legis-
lature bans recording within a certain distance of a police officer on duty, or when a police
officer arrests someone solely because of the presence of a recording device, those actions are
being taken based in part on the expressive content of visibly holding the recording device.”).
247 See Calvert, supra note 1, at 245 (“This analysis, with its uncompromising requirement
that recording must be accompanied by spoken words critical of the police or be done with
an intent to criticize the police, is troubling for two key reasons. First, it suggests that citizens
may be protected by the First Amendment when they record images of police, but only if they
first announce, either through their words or their expressive actions, to the very same officers
they are recording, that they are doing so to criticize or challenge the officers’ actions.”).
248 Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014).
249 Williams, supra note 189, at 640.
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or ample alternatives makes little difference because there are effectively no alterna-
tives available that can adequately substitute for the opportunity to record an official.
While protestors who are denied the opportunity to sleep in a national park as part
of a protest against homelessness are still able to communicate their message, a
protestor denied the ability to film an altercation between a law enforcement officer
and a member of the public or an interaction between an elected official and a con-
stituent is permanently denied the opportunity to communicate that image. A mere
description of such an interaction is often not a sufficient alternative. Video of incidents
such as the vicious beating of Rodney King by the Los Angeles Police Department
or the death of Eric Gardner at the hands of the New York City Police Department
depict altercations that would be difficult or impossible to describe in words alone and
which would be unlikely to achieve credibility, let alone the level of national notoriety
and importance that they did without video footage.250
Therefore, any restriction under a time place and manner test would likely have
to preserve the ability of bystanders to film. At the same time, regulations for the pur-
poses of safety that do not otherwise inhibit the ability to film, such as those sug-
gested by the First and Third Circuits would likely be acceptable under this standard.
A time, place, and manner test would also allow government to assert legitimate
interests such as safety in implementing content-neutral regulation of the right to
record. While the ability to record would be protected, interference with the business
of public officials in such a way as to endanger those officials or members of the
public could be limited. Thus, a time, place, and manner test would preserve some
flexibility, while at the same time allowing a broad and robust right to record.
If recording is a form of information gathering, however, a much broader set of
restrictions becomes possible. Under the Richmond News test, information gathering
is a structural right and the interest in gathering information must be weighed against
the relevant opposing interests and ought to be evaluated in terms of the value of the
information sought.251 This is a much lower bar to regulation than is a time, place,
and manner test.252 Under this formulation, the interest of the individual recording
250 See German Lopez, How Video Changed Americans’ Views Toward the Police, From
Rodney King to Alton Sterling, VOX (July 6, 2016, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy
-and-politics/2015/12/10/9886504/police-shooting-video-confidence [https://perma.cc
/KMM7-CKBZ] (“In 1991, four white Los Angeles police officers brutally beat Rodney King,
an unarmed black man, as it was caught on video, sparking local riots and putting a spotlight
on longstanding feelings of distrust toward law enforcement in minority communities. . . . The
proliferation of video through smartphones, dashboard cameras, and body cameras—and social
media’s ability to send a video into viral overdrive—has played a major role in holding police
accountable . . . .”); see also Jessica Glenza & Oliver Laughland, One Year Later: Eric Garner’s
Death Led to Most Active U.S. Protests Since 1960s, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2015, 2:21 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/17/one-year-ago-eric-garner-new-york
[https://perma.cc/ET5W-6XMD].
251 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–89 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
252 See id. at 588–89.
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and the value of the information sought via recording would be balanced against the
interests of the government or the public official being filmed in not being recorded.
The most obvious interest that might be asserted would be a right to privacy,
confidentiality, or safety. While safety interests would likely be upheld under a time,
place, and manner test so long as they do not interfere with the ability of an individual
to record, under an information gathering framework, there is no requirement that an
individual have an adequate alternative to access the information sought because the
right to gather information is not a speech right. Therefore, recording could be directly
prohibited and the opportunity to record severely curtailed if a court were to find that
the interest asserted by the government or public official was sufficiently compelling.
Proponents of an information gathering framework generally focus on the privacy
implications of a broad right to record.253 They emphasize that constant surveillance
tends to alter behavior, interfere with the ability of public officials to execute their
responsibilities properly, and impair the exercise of good government.254 Indeed,
concerns about the alteration of behavior for the worse is the justification most often
raised to defend the practice of forbidding video and still photography from the
Supreme Court and many courts of appeals and district courts.255 These objections
should be taken seriously. Some officials, particularly elected ones may feel increased
pressure to behave differently in front of the camera than they might in a setting
without cameras.256 Some commentators have even suggested that the deterioration
of congressional debate can be tied directly to the advent of C-SPAN.257 However,
recording of public officials may also alter their behavior in beneficial ways. Indeed,
the impetus behind the implementation of body cameras is often the idea that law
enforcement officers will behave better if they know that their interactions with the
public are being recorded.258 Such recordings can even increase public confidence
when police departments can offer video evidence of well-handled altercations.259
253 See generally Kaminski, supra note 140.
254 See id. at 171–72; Susan Davis, C-SPAN Hits 35-Year Mark, USA TODAY (Mar. 19,
2014, 6:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/19/cspan-anniver
sary/6577593/ [https://perma.cc/KE9P-P687] (“[T]elevision coverage of floor debates and
committee hearings has contributed to the coarsening of debate and the polarization between
the parties.”); see also Nancy S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1489, 1492–93, 1535 (2012) (“Justice Kennedy . . . . worried that the tenor
would be ineluctably altered by the introduction of cameras in the Supreme Court.”).
255 See generally Marder, supra note 254.
256 See id. at 1555–56.
257 See Davis, supra note 254.
258 See generally Thomas Gardiner & Patrick Molinari, Body Cameras: A New Era in
Policing, DCBA BRIEF, https://www.dcba.org/mpage/v30gardinermolinar [https://perma.cc
/2QW7-RJ4W] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
259 See, e.g., Brad Evans, Video: Body Cam Footage Shows Altercation Between Woman,
Officer, NBC 5, https://www.mynbc5.com/article/video-body-cam-footage-shows-altercation
-between-woman-officer/10246731 [https://perma.cc/5G89-SSTU] (last updated July 6, 2017,
3:58 PM).
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Ultimately, the aim of a broad right to record is to increase public accountability.
While we may not always like the way that officials respond to the prospect of in-
creased accountability, and recordings may not always increase public confidence
or the efficient working of government, the value of video recordings to civil society
and an informed populace certainly outweigh these concerns when it comes to
recording officials in public.
Furthermore, reasonable regulations would still be permitted under a speech
creation framework. While public officials would have to forgo a certain amount of
privacy in their public duties under this framework, interests in safety and protection
from harassment would be able to be vindicated.
Additionally, under an information gathering framework, the court would also
be asked to consider the value of the information sought. This would require courts
to make value judgments about the relative importance, not only of recording
different classes of official but also of the specific circumstances of each individual
case. This is a recipe for an inconsistent right that depends on the predilections of
the reviewing court. It is also possible that this would lead to a hierarchy of access.
If the ability to record officials depends in part on a court’s determination of the value
of the information sought, it is easy to imagine that recording of police officers
might be afforded greater latitude than recording of congressmen and recording of
congressmen more than that of judges. While the ability to record law enforcement
officers is of particular importance as many courts have noted, the conduct of other
officials, both appointed and elected is certainly a matter of public interest. While
reasonable people may disagree over the relative importance of being able to record
different officials, a speech creation framework would resolve these debates in favor
of increased public access across the board.
An information-gathering framework would effectively allow government to sub-
stantially limit the ability of individuals to record many types of public officials outside
of the law enforcement context. So long as a court deems the interest of the official
in not being recorded as significant enough and the value of the information sought
sparse enough, governments could effectively prohibit recording in certain contexts.
If, on the other hand, recording is speech creation, content-neutral regulations
of recording would have to satisfy a time, place, and manner test. This would grant
substantial protection to the right to record, as it is effectively impossible to ensure
ample alternatives to recording.
CONCLUSION
The right to record public officials is an increasingly important element of civil
society in the United States. Recordings of police activity, public meetings, and other
public officials have become a critical element of how Americans interact with their
elected officials and discuss public affairs. Recordings help keep officials account-
able by exposing misconduct and other abuses by officials. They can also help keep
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citizens engaged in the political process by demonstrating instances of good and
responsive government, as well.
While many courts have recognized a right to record, and most Americans live
in a jurisdiction where the right to record has been enshrined, they have largely
failed to identify the specific doctrine by which First Amendment protection is ex-
tended to the right to record.260 The cursory analysis employed by most of the courts
that have examined the issue is an insufficient basis in which to ground such an
important right.
As this Note argues, there are two potential doctrines under which the right to
record could fall. It could either be considered speech creation261—and therefore an
activity inextricably bound up with expression—or it could be considered informa-
tion gathering262—and thus a structural right, important to the vindication of First
Amendment rights but analyzed under a balancing test.
The more natural framework through which to analyze the right to record is the
speech creation framework.263 Modern recording technology and the interconnected-
ness afforded to individuals by ubiquitous internet access have increasingly made
the temporal distinction between the act of recording and the act of publishing
irrelevant or nonexistent.264 This trend can only be expected to continue as connec-
tivity expands and technology improves. These technological changes make the charac-
terization of the act of recording as akin to information gathering an increasingly
strained interpretation. Recording is more akin to core speech than ever before, and
increasingly so. It is clearly bound up in the expressive act of disseminating a video.
The act of recording clearly fits more naturally within the speech creation framework.
Characterized as speech creation, the right to record would extend core First
Amendment protections. Therefore, governments could not directly prohibit or
regulate recording of public officials without a compelling state interest. When
content-neutral regulations infringe on the right to record, they would have to satisfy
a time, place, and manner test which would provide substantial protection to the
right to record, given the relative unavailability of substitutes to recording. A limited
regulatory regime along these lines would reserve a broad right to record. A broad
right to record serves an important societal interest by enhancing the ability of civil
society to monitor and make accountable all public officials for actions taken in their
official capacity. At the same time, the government would still have the latitude to
impose reasonable regulations in the interest of safety.
The courts should clarify their right to record jurisprudence by adopting an
understanding of the right to record grounded in speech creation jurisprudence and
reserving a robust right of citizens to record their public officials.
260 See discussion supra Part I.
261 See discussion supra Section II.B.
262 See discussion supra Section II.A.
263 See discussion supra Part III.
264 See discussion supra Section III.A.
